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Abstract 
 
The widespread trends towards markets liberalisation, decline in trade union power, 
and flexible work organization were expected to push collective bargaining 
institutions to converge to a decentralised bargaining structure. This crude version of 
the neoliberal convergence thesis, however, was not borne out. Instead, change in 
employment relations has been more nuanced than initially thought. This paper 
explores the conditions under which centralisation of bargaining is possible, even in a 
more competitive environment with pressures for greater flexibility. It draws on case 
study evidence from the Italian telecommunications industry, tracing back the process 
of liberalisation since the early 1990s. It is shown how the strategies and the 
coalitions between organised labour, business and the state explain in large part this 
path of institutional change. 
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Introduction 
 
From the Single European Act of 1986 until the completion of the Single Market in 
1992 the focus of rules harmonisation within the European Union shifted from 
traditional industries towards utilities and services. The European Commission held 
that distortions in competition could come from sectors providing a backbone to 
economic activity. Therefore ‘network industries’ such as telecommunications, 
financial services, transportation (railways, shipping, airlines), and energy (electricity, 
gas) became part of the agenda of EU liberalisation (Begg & El-Agraa, 2004). The 
legislation over the single market required the liberalisation of state monopolies, but it 
did not require a change in the ownership of state firms. Nevertheless, national 
governments across Europe launched a series of privatisation programmes reducing 
the extent of public ownership in these sectors. The twin processes of liberalisation 
and privatisation marked the withdrawal of the state from direct regulation and 
ownership of those sectors. Regulation was delegated to independent authorities, and 
ownership transferred to private actors. These processes were expected to have a 
‘domino effect’ on collective bargaining institutions leading to a generalised 
decentralisation of bargaining (Crouch, 2000; Dolvik, 2004; Wallerstein, 1998) and 
this expectation was based on several grounds.  
 
On the one hand, the opening up of those markets to competition was expected to 
weaken the incentive for labour cost-standardisation from the part of the firms (Reder 
& Ulman, 1993; Wallerstein, 1998). According to this hypothesis, as barriers to trade 
across countries are eliminated and protection of industries is removed, competition 
within product markets is increased. This was expected to weaken the logic of ‘taking 
wages out of competition’ through collective bargaining (Marginson, Sisson, & 
Arrowsmith, 2003:164) and lead to the abandonment of sectoral labour market 
institutions. On the other hand, the increased needs for ‘work organisation flexibility’ 
rendered collective bargaining agreements as less attractive. Needs for flexibility 
included the adoption of new human resource strategies in response to changes in 
technology (Katz, 1993), the introduction of incentive pay systems (Brown & Walsh, 
1991), and a move towards ‘flatter management hierarchies’ (Brown & Walsh, 1991; 
Katz, 1993). Changes in product market demand required adoption of more flexible 
working time arrangements, and individual firms were expected to prefer to introduce 
incentive pay systems so as to align pay with performance. Industry-wide bargaining 
was regarded as too inflexible to accommodate these needs for flexibility, for 
instance, when central negotiators can only set wages in broad job 
descriptions/classifications (Zagelmeyer, 2005) or specify rigid working schedules. 
Overall, the pressures from market liberalisation and diffusion of flexible working 
practices were the implicit forces putting pressure for institutional convergence to a 
decentralised company-level bargaining structure. How can we explain, therefore, the 
successful efforts to centralise bargaining, despite the intensification of competition 
and pervasive introduction of flexible working practices?  
 
The paper follows the ‘most-likely’ case-study research design (George & Bennett, 
2005:122). The Italian telecommunications sector was ‘most likely’ to end up with an 
Anglo-Saxon decentralised bargaining structure. As the next sections will show, the 
liberalisation of the market led to an intensification of competition, whereas the 
introduction of flexible working practices was pervasive. Yet, in the early 2000s one 
observes a centralization of collective bargaining at the industry level. The empirical 
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section seeks to explain this puzzling outcome with data gathered through primary 
sources and a series of interviews with key informants. It is argued that the coalitions 
between collective actors mediated the pressures from liberalisation and flexibility 
and shaped the new institution of centralised collective bargaining. More specifically, 
the conditions that allowed this path of change entailed (i) that trade unions in the 
sector appeared able to speak with a single voice and forged a coalition with the state 
and (ii) that the peak employers association was able to offer to the firms in the sector 
a very lucrative compromise with ‘the best of both worlds’: standardisation at the 
industry level and flexibility at the company level. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section examines the evolution of Italian 
telecoms from a monopoly into a liberalised market, pins down the operation of 
competitive forces and sketches how work organisation flexibility became pervasive. 
The second section turns to the organisational changes in the structures of trade 
unions and business associations, which are critical for the overall direction of 
change. The third section traces the process of centralisation of collective bargaining 
and seeks to explain this pattern of institutional change by reference to the strategies 
and coalitions between and within collective actors. The final section concludes by 
discussing the implications of the argument for wider debates in comparative 
employment systems literature. 
 
1. The Italian Telecommunications Industry: Market Liberalisation and Work 
Organisation Flexibility 
 
1.1. Italian Telecoms until the 1980s: Monopoly and State Ownership 
 
The telecommunications industry in Italy has historically been segmented, due to the 
different concession agreements that were granted to private telephone operators in 
the early 20th century. In the 1960s the concession agreements expired, and the 
telecoms branch (IRI-STET) of the state-owned IRI holding company (Istituto di 
Reconstruzione Industriale) purchased shares of the regional operators. Thus it 
created a public monopoly under the name of SIP1. However, the nationalised 
company retained a divided organisational structure and the national territory was 
divided into the five zones in which the previous five companies operated. This 
structure contributed to the persistence of inefficiencies, for example, bureaucratic 
relationships within and across management levels; duplicated tasks and 
responsibilities; and wasteful human resource practices (Negrelli, 1996:296-297). 
These organisational inefficiencies were amplified by the fact there were still different 
companies in charge of different parts of the communications infrastructure leading to 
an excessive institutional fragmentation (Schneider, 2001:68). While SIP was mainly 
responsible for provision of telecoms services to households and business, Telespazio 
was responsible for satellite communications, SIRM for maritime communications, 
Iritel for public telephone services, Italcable handled international calls, and ASST 
dealt with long-distance (intercity) calls. Unlike other telecommunications operators, 
the nationalisation in Italy did not lead to a unification of the system’s sub-sets. 
 
                                                 
1 In fact, SIP stands for Società Idroelettrica Piemontese, the name of the company before becoming 
Società Italiana per l'Esercizio Telefonico. 
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Two initiatives stand out as responses to the challenge of persisting inefficiencies in 
the early 1980s. The first related to intra-firm reorganisation, and the second was 
oriented to the restructuring of the whole industry. Intra-firm reorganisation in SIP 
involved inter alia: abolition of old geographical divisions that corresponded to 
different entrepreneurial and technical cultures; changes in work organisation away 
from bureaucratic and repetitive jobs towards enlarged job tasks; annualised working 
hours; and incentive pay systems for sales staff (Negrelli, 1996: 297-299). Despite 
conflict and disagreements, the trade unions and SIP management managed to reach 
compromises and signed related company-level agreements in 1982 and 1984 to 
modernise the company. 
 
In addition to that, the Spadolini government tried to achieve a restructuring of the 
whole sector in the early 1980s and established an expert commission directed by 
Franco Morganti to develop recommendations for action (Schneider, 2001:69). The 
recommendations of the Committee included the complete liberalisation of the 
terminal market as well as new telematic services, but –unlike developments in 
Britain at the time– the experts defended the preservation of the public monopoly in 
the fixed telephony network. The Committee aimed at ending the fragmentation in the 
industry, and proposed the consolidation of the various telecoms organisations (SIP, 
Telespazio, Italcable, SIRM, Iritel described above) and integrating them into a single 
public monopoly (monopolio intelligente) (Schneider, 2001:69). Still, a series of 
upheavals in Italian politics did not allow the implementation of any of the proposals. 
 
The inertia persisted until 1987, when the government established a five year plan 
(Piano Europa) in order to boost competitiveness in the sector and reduce the 
technological gap with other European nations (Graziosi, 1988:308; Thatcher, 
2007:193). In addition to technological developments abroad, the advent of the Single 
European Market in 1992 was a recurrent theme used to justify the urgent need for 
institutional reform (Graziosi, 1988:302; Thatcher, 2007:193). The Piano Europa was 
consistent with earlier proposals of the Morganti Committee, suggesting the 
integration of the traditionally fragmented system into a ‘super-SIP’ (or ‘super-
STET’). As Thatcher (2007:194-95) argues, consolidation was thought to be 
important for two reasons: (i) it would allow the privatisation of the company in the 
near future and (ii) it would establish a powerful Italian telecoms group, able to 
compete with other ‘national champions’ such as British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom 
and France Telecom. In 1992 a new law reorganised SIP through the creation of 
‘STET-Telecom Italia’ and a merger between the different companies followed 
(Baroncelli, 1998). At last, the single ‘Telecom Italia’ was born in 1994. 
 
1.2. Liberalisation, Privatisation and Intensification of Competition 
 
European economic integration was partly responsible for the ‘Piano Europa’, but the 
European impact would be felt more strongly during the 1990s. Following the 
transposition of the Directives for the ‘opening up’ of the mobile and later fixed-
telephony markets, new players appeared in Italy alongside the incumbent Telecom 
Italia. Starting with mobile telephony, the Olivetti manufacturing group acquired the 
first licence and established the Omnitel subsidiary in 1995, which began competing 
with the incumbent’s subsidiary in mobile telephony (Telecom Italia Mobile/TIM). 
The Italian electricity company (ENEL) established WIND in the late 1990s, while 
Blu and the Chinese ‘3’ entered the market soon after. By the early 2000s competitive 
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pressures in the mobile phone segment appeared strong, as illustrated by the rapidly 
eroding market shares of the leading firm (Table 1). Telecom Italia Mobile had the 
lead in the market share in 2000s, but strong competition led to a sharp decline from 
56 per cent in 2000 to 37 per cent in 2009. At the same time, the foreign entrants such 
as the British Vodafone and Chinese ‘3’ increased their shares significantly. 
 
Table 1. Market Shares (based on subscribers) in Mobile Telephony in Italy, 2000 
– 2009. 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Leading operator 56 48 46 47 46 40 41 40 39 37 
Main competitor 36 35 34 36 35 32 32 33 32 33 
Third+Other 
competitors 8 17 20 17 19 27 27 27 29 30 
Source: European Commission (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
 
Similar changes are observed in the fixed-telephony segment of the market, albeit 
with a few years lag. The first company to compete with Telecom Italia in the fixed 
network was Albacom, which was established in 1995 and was later acquired by BT 
Italia. In 1997 the Olivetti Group established a subsidiary in fixed telephony called 
Infostrada, which was later acquired by WIND. Finally, Teletu started in 1999 and 
was acquired by Vodafone in 2010. Competition in the market was steered by 
AGCOM (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni), which was the sector’s 
independent regulator authority established by Law 249 of July 31, 1997. AGCOM 
followed a rather restrictive tariff policy for Telecom Italia, allowing new entrants to 
compete for services using the ‘last mile’ of the fixed network infrastructure and 
preventing Telecom Italia from ‘abusing’ its dominant position (Sacripanti, 1999). 
Table 2 presents the rapid decline in the market share of the Telecom Italia from 100 
per cent (monopoly) in late 1990s to 65 per cent in the late 2000s. 
 
Table 2. Incumbent Telecom Operator's Market Share (based on retail revenue) 
in Fixed Telephony in Italy, 1997 - 2008. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
100 100 99 93 75 70 68 n/a 65 64 62 65 
Source: European Commission (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
 
The above table sketches the picture of intensified competition within the Italian 
fixed-telephony market. Although Telecom Italia’s market share remained large until 
the end of 2000s, occupying more than half of the market, competitive pressures 
appeared strong throughout the decade. A comparison with the respective UK market 
is illustrative: BT lost on average 2.66 per cent annually for the period examined, 
whereas Telecom Italia lost on average 2.91 per cent annually for the exact same 
period. In sum, the monopoly position of Telecom Italia was eroded at a high speed 
and market competition intensified. 
 
Although the liberalisation was largely guided by the European Commission’s 
agenda, the privatisation of Telecom Italia was on the agenda of successive 
governments. The consensus on privatisation was based on the common goal of 
raising funds so as to reduce the national debt and eventually join the Economic and 
Monetary Union (Thatcher, 2007:195).  
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For the privatisation of Telecom Italia, the solution that was favoured included: a 
‘stable core’ of large shareholders having an 18 per cent stake, while another 35 per 
cent was sold via initial public offering (IPO) to the stock exchange (Florio, 2007:3). 
In sum, 35 years after the nationalisation of the 1960s, the state ownership of Telecom 
Italia ended on 20 October 1997. Interestingly, Telecom Italia became the object of 
three successive hostile takeovers after privatisation.  
 
The first hostile takeover was an initiative led by the Olivetti Group. While the 
Telecom Italia CEO at the time, Fransesco Bernabé, tried to erect defences against the 
hostile takeover, these did not work, partly because the government did not whole-
heartedly embrace them. The most important one was the search for a ‘white knight’ 
(i.e. finding a friendly-bidder who would offer a higher bid than the hostile bidder). 
The main candidate for that position was Deutsche Telekom, which was allegedly a 
‘problematic’ white knight. Since the German state owned a 72 per cent of Deutsche 
Telekom, this meant that it would end up control 40 per cent of the merged company. 
That would have led to a foreign renationalization of Italy’s biggest listed company, 
and ‘it was too much for the Italian government to stomach’.2 Massimo D’Alema, 
who had become Prime Minister in the meantime, entered into negotiations with the 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. However, the negotiations failed, since 
Germany was not willing to privatise Deutsche Telekom in the near future, and 
Massimo D’Alema eventually favoured the Olivetti solution (Kruse, 2005). It was 
thought that it would be better if Telecom Italia fell onto Italian hands, rather than the 
German state, and thus, the hostile takeover was completed by the end of May 1999.  
 
Still, the Olivetti control of Telecom Italia was not bound to last. The second hostile 
takeover was largely a consequence of the first one, because Olivetti effectively 
bought a company that was five times larger than itself, financing the acquisition via 
debt. But servicing the debt was not easy and the performance of Telecom Italia’s 
stocks was unimpressive in the next two years. An alliance between Pirelli and 
Benetton seized the opportunity and offered a very lucrative bid for the holding 
company that controlled Telecom Italia. On 28 July 2001 Pirelli and Benetton 
acquired the holding company and gained the control of Telecom Italia (Florio, 2007). 
But this was no the end of it, either. In 2007, a consortium led by Italian banks and the 
Spanish Telefonica, acquired the holding company through which Pirelli and 
Benetton retained control of Telecom Italia. The Prime Minister Romano Prodi 
accepted the deal under the condition that Spanish Telefonica will only be a minority 
shareholder, and the majority of control will remain in Italian hands.3 
 
1.3. Restructuring the Telecoms: Technological Change, Downsizing, and 
‘Negotiated’ Flexibility 
 
The processes of liberalisation and privatisation that were described in the previous 
section undoubtedly hold a prominent place in the recent history of Italian telecoms. 
They coincided with fast moving technological advances, which brought about 
dramatic changes in the work organisation of telecoms operators internationally. The 
differences are monumental, if one considers that most of European telecoms 
                                                 
2 Marcus Walker, ‘The Sack of Telecom Italia’, Euromoney, July 1999, Issue 363. 
3 ‘Italian banks win control of Telecom Italia’ New York Times, (29/04/2007). 
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operators in the 1980s were an extended part of slow moving public bureaucracy, 
sometimes merged with the postal office (Thatcher, 2007). At that time, work 
organisation was characterised by high job security, internal labour markets, seniority-
based promotion and pay, and a strict job classification system (Katz & Darbishire, 
2000). By the early 2000s the ex-monopolies found themselves operating in very 
competitive markets, and employment practices shifted towards new performance 
management and work redesign with increased working time flexibility (Doellgast, 
Nohara, & Tchobanian, 2009:387-389). 
 
Inevitably, Italian telecoms were bound to follow these international trends. 
Functional flexibility and the need for new and versatile skills among employees were 
necessitated more directly in responses to changes in technology (Frey & Vivarelli, 
1991). Already in the SIP era, the trade unions frequently revised job descriptions so 
that they correspond to new technologies, and the job classification system was made 
flatter leading to job enrichment and multi-tasking employees (Negrelli, 1996). 
 
After the merger between the five telecommunications companies (SIP, Italcable, 
Telespazio, Iritel, and SIRM) into a single Telecom Italia the negotiations began for 
the conclusion of the new company agreement in 1994. The main aim of the wage 
agreement was to harmonise pay and working conditions in the previously disparate 
companies; a necessary pre-condition to facilitate its restructuring and eventual 
privatisation. The merger process allowed large cost savings via ‘improvements in the 
organisation of work and services’ and was expected to generate even greater savings 
in the future.4 However, the business restructuring and reorganisation involved 
inevitable redundancies. 
 
Already in the mid-1990s, the firm level unions in Telecom Italia anticipated the 
sweeping structural changes in the sector. As a result, the 1995/6 company agreement 
was foreseen to lay ‘the foundations for a new national contract for the 
telecommunications industry, which might be extended to other operators once the 
market opened up’.5 Italian trade unionists accepted pragmatically the inevitability of 
privatisation (Thatcher, 2007:195) and were more interested in managing the social 
repercussions, by negotiating the terms of restructuring across the whole industry.  
 
Indeed, the 1995 company agreement stipulated that downsizing would be achieved 
through voluntary redundancies, while flexibility was introduced via four avenues: 
teleworking, geographical mobility, part-time working, and franchising.6 Teleworking 
(remotizzazione) was especially facilitated by technological advances and would help 
alleviate the problem of having some overstaffed divisions, while other divisions were 
understaffed. This measure was complemented by geographical mobility, providing 
bonuses for workers willing to transfer to other workplaces according to company 
needs. Part-time working was an option given to employees who were neither eligible 
for voluntary exit, nor eligible for geographical mobility. Still, there were limits to 
part-time working set to 12 per cent of the workforce by business unit. Finally, one 
very innovative measure was literally transforming ex-employees into entrepreneurs: 
                                                 
4 Interview with sectoral business representative at ‘Telecom Italy pay and conditions harmonized’ 
EIRR, No. 250, (November 1994), p.9-10. 
5 Interview with sectoral labour representative at ‘Accordo per i telefonici Bonus e orario flessibile’ La 
Stampa, No. 249, (10/09/1996), p.17. 
6 ‘Flexibility and job losses at Telecom Italia’ EIRR, No. 261 (October  1995), pp.20-22 
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former employees would be offered the opportunity to open a franchised shop selling 
Telecom Italia products and services. The company would offer financial incentives 
in a lump sum as well as training and advice on how to get a commercial license. 
 
The structural changes that the sector was undergoing surfaced again during 
negotiations in 1996 in the form of increased needs for flexibility. On the employers’ 
side the rationale was that ‘competition in the telecom market means that existing 
“privileges” are no longer affordable’.7 Therefore, the company wanted to squeeze 
labour costs by reducing the wages for new recruits, and increasing working time 
from 38 to 40 hours per week (annualised). Eventually, a deal was reached between 
the state employers’ federation Intersind and the telecoms unions providing for: (i) 
revision of the grading system; (ii) introduction of working time flexibilities; and (iii) 
the introduction of three forms of teleworking for different staff grades.8 The grading 
system was revised so that the number of grades is reduced from ten to eight, 
signifying a move towards ‘flatter’ management hierarchies. There was an 
introduction of flexible working time depending on company needs and customer 
demand. Part time working was also encouraged, while overtime compensation was 
also regulated and extended to part-time workers. Finally, the agreement established 
three forms of teleworking: (i) home teleworking (aimed at low-skilled employees, 
such as telephone operators); (ii) working-out tele-workers (more skilled employees 
such as accountants and computer managers, providing services which might 
eventually mature into a full outsourcing) and (iii) remote teleworking, (individuals 
working from specially equipped tele-work centres, involving operators in more 
remote areas).9 
 
Naturally, the ‘search for flexibility’ did not end with the privatisation of Telecom 
Italia in 1997. After the hostile takeover of Telecom Italia by Olivetti, the company 
incurred a huge debt and the new management tried to cut down on labour costs 
(Florio, 2007:4). This cost-cutting strategy is mostly telling in the firm level 
agreement that was concluded on 28 March 2000 and involved massive cuts 
including: redundancy via compulsory retirement; phased retirement via increased 
unemployment benefit for those close to retirement; retraining and redeployment; 
reduced working time and pay cuts for other employees to avoid redundancies (called 
‘solidarity contracts’, see below); and switch from full time to part-time 
employment.10 Additionally, the company planned to squeeze labour costs even 
further via recruiting some 6,200 workers on apprenticeship/work-entry contracts and 
contracts designed to provide young people with work experience, especially from 
high unemployment areas in Southern Italy. 
 
However, introduction of work and pay flexibilities were not only taking place inside 
the privatised Telecom Italia, but were also pursued within the other operators. The 
main competitor of Telecom Italia in the fixed telephony network, Infostrada, was 
also introducing several types of flexibilities. On 21 September 1998, an agreement 
was signed between the management of Infostrada and the metalworking trade unions 
                                                 
7 Interview with sectoral business representative at ‘Bargaining Round-up’ EIRR, No.268 (May 1996), 
p.9-10 
8 ‘Telecom deal increases pay and introduces flexible working time’ EIRR, No. 268, (May 1996), p.9-
10. 
9 ‘Telecom deal increases pay and introduces flexible working time’ EIRR, No. 268, (May 1996), p.10. 
10 ‘Redundancy Deal at Telecom Italia’ EIRR, No. 316 (May 2000), p.9. 
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(Fiom-Cgil, Fim-Cisl and Uilm-Uil) on a plan to recruit about 1,300 workers for the 
company's call centres. Crucially, the two sides agreed on a high degree of work 
organisation flexibility, including: (i) about half of the workers would be hired on 
fixed-term part-time contracts, while the rest would be hired on apprenticeship/work-
entry contracts (ii) the company would subsequently convert up to two thirds of fixed-
term part-time contracts into permanent part-time contracts (depending on actual 
business volumes) (iii) pilot introduction of incentives and performance related-pay 
systems, before generalised implementation (iv) a minimum service would be 
guaranteed during strikes, while Sunday work would be allowed and finally (v) a joint 
committee would be set up to study the operation of the 24/7 shift system, with is 
findings put down for joint assessment. 11 
 
The agreement was received with satisfaction from the unions’ side, despite the 
increased levels of flexibility it entailed. The representative from the CGIL union in 
the negotiations, Gian Piero Castano, justified the choice to accept increased 
flexibility on the grounds of the potential for future employment creation stating that:  
 
‘This choice - which has already been introduced at Omnitel, is made necessary by the 
two factors of lnfostrada being a relatively new company and the telecommunications 
sector being still a developing one. The unions are confident that the consolidation of 
Infostrada's business will be matched by a corresponding consolidation of employment, 
as has happened in the Omnitel case.’12  
 
This assessment was also shared by the other main union in the sector, CISL, whose 
representative, Giorgio Paolo, applauded the employment creation potential in the 
sector, admitting that increased flexibility is very important especially in customer 
care segment.13 
 
In sum, the new market entrants in Italian telecommunications introduced a great 
degree of flexibility in working practices so as to survive the competitive environment 
and meet customer demand responding to fast moving technological change. 
However, the increased levels of employment flexibility were equally observed in the 
privatised Telecom Italia. The Italian unions in the sector accepted pragmatically the 
need for greater flexibility in working practices. In both the Italian incumbent and the 
new entrants, the types and limits to flexibility were the outcome of negotiations, 
specified within the context of firm level agreements; hence, flexibility was 
negotiated. The next section examines the issues of labour and business representation 
in more detail. 
 
                                                 
11 ‘Flexible job-creation agreement reached at Infostrada’ EIROnline, (October 1998), available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/10/feature/it9810237f.htm [accessed: 25/09/2011]. 
12 Interview with sectoral labour representative at: ‘Flexible job-creation agreement reached at 
Infostrada’ EIROnline, (October 1998), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/10/feature/it9810237f.htm [accessed: 25/09/2011]. 
13 Interview with sectoral labour representative at ‘Flexible job-creation agreement reached at 
Infostrada’, EIROnline, (October 1998), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/10/feature/it9810237f.htm [accessed: 25/09/2011]. 
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2. The Representation of Labour and Business in Italian Telecommunications 
2.1. Labour: ‘Single Voice’ despite Organisational Fragmentation 
 
The previous section hinted that representatives from the confederal trade unions were 
active not only within Telecom Italia (where they had a long history of 
representation), but also within the new companies that entered the sector. This point 
is worth emphasising, because prima facie there are several characteristics that may 
jeopardise Italian unions’ capacity to speak with a ‘single voice’ and represent the 
interests of labour in the newly liberalised sector. The representation of labour 
interests could be problematic in three ways. 
 
The first danger for united labour representation was between the privatised 
incumbent (which had the greatest share of employment) and the new firms in the 
sector (which involved far fewer employees). Employees in the privatised Telecom 
Italia already enjoyed a higher level of pay and conditions via their wage agreements, 
which were far better than the rates prevalent in the new firms, and this might lead to 
divisions with ‘them and us’ attitudes. A second source of danger for labour 
representation stems from the Italian industrial relations system, and the nature of 
competitive relations between union confederations. The new telecoms companies 
would offer a new pool of potential members and there was a danger that the 
confederal unions could be dragged into a spiral of internal conflicts, competing for 
new members with each other. Finally, there was always the chance that employees in 
the new firms could organise bottom-up via militant grass-roots unionisation. This 
was not unlikely, because such organisations (the so-called COBAS) were a frequent 
phenomenon in Italian manufacturing and parts of the public sector. 
 
In spite of the dangers that liberalisation posed to labour representation in the sector, 
Italian unions managed to skilfully avoid all those hurdles. The danger of ending up 
with a cleavage between incumbent and new firms was avoided, because unions 
followed an inclusive strategy. Telecom Italia unions (FILPT, SILT, and UILTE) 
were transformed into sectoral-level associations embracing the workers in the new 
firms. The first union that was transformed was CGIL’s affiliate union FILPT. In 
1997 it was renamed into SLC merging the previous separate post/telecom union and 
the information/broadcasting union. CISL’s affiliate union SILT was also transformed 
into FISTEL covering also employees in all firms in telecoms, IT and broadcasting, 
Finally UIL’s affiliate UILTE was transformed into UILCOM. Thus, the process of 
filling the gap in new workers’ representation took place ‘top-down’. This process 
was not problem-free. For instance, employees in some of the new firms such as 
Omnitel (now Vodafone) were initially represented by metalworkers’ sector unions, 
but the problem of ‘jurisdiction’ was resolved at the confederal level, with telecoms 
unionists taking over representation from their colleagues in manufacturing, and also 
organising workers in the newly established firms.14 
 
In addition to that, the dangers of having internal fights and compete for members was 
also avoided because the unions shared a common strategic objective for the sector: 
centralising bargaining via a single sectoral contract. Importantly, this vision was 
shared long before the liberalisation was completed. As mentioned in the previous 
                                                 
14 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 6 (25/11/2010). 
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section, unionists from all three confederations in Telecom Italia were resolved to use 
the incumbent’s wage agreement as the foundation for a national contract in the sector 
and extend it to new operators.15 To that end, the three sectoral federations (Filpt, Silt 
and Uilta) followed a two pronged strategy already since 1996: on the one hand, 
putting pressures to telecoms firms via national strikes, and on the other, urging the 
government to ensure ‘fair competition’ in the sector via a national collective 
agreement in telecoms.16 
 
The final danger for labour unity was the prospect of militant grass-roots organisation 
such as the COBAS (Comitati di Base). Already in the 1980s, the three confederations 
had experience of militant COBAS in several sectors. This led them to devise a new 
institutional solution: the RSUs (Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria). This provision 
was foreseen in the monumental July 1993 Accord between the government, the 
unions and Confindustria17, but was also further specified in the bi-partite inter-
confederal Accord of 20 December 1993. Confindustria, together with the three main 
union confederations agreed that representation at workplaces over 15 employees 
would take place through RSUs, of which two thirds of their members would come 
from direct elections and one third would be appointed by the confederations. Still, 
the RSU would be considered independent and not affiliated with any of the three 
main unions. Thereby, independent grass roots unionists would be represented 
without formal affiliation, appeasing their militant tendencies. Indeed, RSUs were 
established in all main companies such as WIND and Vodafone and as the later 
section shows, they were influential in negotiating the extension and inclusion of call-
centres’ workers under the umbrella of the sectoral agreement.  In sum, despite 
organisational fragmentation, Italian unions were able to ‘speak with a single voice’ 
and pursue their strategy of centralisation. 
 
Table 3. Main Trade Union Organisations in the Italian Telecoms Sector. 
Organisation Function/Affiliation Membership/Structure 
Sindacato Lavoratori 
Comunicazione  
SLC/ CGIL  
Est. as FILPT-CGIL 
Signatory to national sectoral 
wage agreement; Affiliated to 
ex-communist CGIL 
Members:15,000 (2006). 
Federazione sindacale 
della  informazione 
dello spettacolo e delle 
telecomunicazioni 
FISTEL/CISL 
Est. as SILT-CISL  
Signatory to national sectoral 
wage agreement;  Affiliated to 
Christian democratic/Catholic 
CISL 
Members: n/a. 
Unione Italiana 
Lavoratori 
Comunicazione 
UILCOM 
Est. as UILTE-UIL  
Signatory to national sectoral 
wage agreement; Affiliated to 
social democratic UIL 
Members:17,302 (2006). 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
                                                 
15 ‘Accordo per i telefonici Bonus e orario flessibile’ La Stampa, No. 249, (10/09/1996), p.17. 
16 ‘Telecom ma ci ami? Allora dacci il contratto’ La Stampa, No. 155, (7/06/1996), p.38.  
17 ‘Central agreement on incomes policy and bargaining reform’ EIRR, No.236 (September 1993), 
p.15-19. 
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2.2. Business: The ‘Privatisation’ of the Employer Associability 
 
The extensive state ownership in the Italian economy meant that there was a large 
pool of publicly owned enterprises alongside the privately owned firms. While 
Confindustria was traditionally the employer representative of private sector, 
Intersind was the employer representative of the public sector enterprises. Intersind 
was set up in 1958 so that it represents state-owned (IRI) firms in labour relations. 
The members of Intersind came from a diverse range of industries such as: 
metalworking, construction, food processing, communications, broadcasting, and 
transport. Following a political agreement in May 1994 between Romano Prodi 
(president of the IRI Group), Luigi Abete (president of Confindustria), and Agostino 
Paci (president of Intersind), it was decided that Intersind would be incorporated into 
Confindustria.18 
 
The agreement stipulated that: (i) Intersind would remain in existence with its current 
membership for two years; however, giving up its role at the ‘inter-confederal level’ 
(ii) over those two years, many of Intersind’s companies will prepare to join the 
relevant sectoral federations of Confindustria (e.g. Federmecanica for metalworking, 
Federalimentare for food processing, etc.) (iii) at the end of that process, Intersind 
would change its name and become the federation representing ‘network services’ 
(i.e. telecommunications, transport, road communication, and broadcasting).19 
 
This incorporation was seen as a necessary step in the large scale privatisation process 
which was taking place in Italy, which was ‘the largest privatisation programme in the 
world during the 1990s, raising about !90 billion between 1992 and 1999’ (Deeg, 
2005:531). On the one hand, this action reaffirmed government’s resolve to proceed 
with privatisation, while on the other hand it would expand Confindustria’s 
membership and representativeness into services sectors which were until then 
dominated by state ownership. Indeed, after the announcement of the merger, 
Confindustria president Luigi Abete stated that: 
 
‘it is an important step in the associations’ representativeness widening process and the 
overcoming of a historical division between public and private employers, and the proof 
that privatisation process is taking place effectively.’20 
 
Notwithstanding its high importance, the mere fact of incorporation of Intersind into 
Confindustria could not lead deterministically into centralisation of bargaining in all 
the network-services sectors. At the first stage, Federcomin (Federazione delle 
Imprese delle Comunicazioni e dell’ Informatica) was established in 1998 after the 
dissolution of Intersind, and absorbed some of the personnel and functions in 
Intersind. Although new telecoms firms became members of Federcomin, the 
association lacked the legal competence to negotiate collective agreements with trade 
unions. 
 
                                                 
18 Interview with business representative at ‘Dissolution of Intersind ends Italy's experience of public 
sector employers’ associations’ EIROnline, (February 1998), available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/02/feature/it9802221f.htm [accessed: 25/09/2011]. 
19 ‘Intersind joins forces with Confindustria’ EIRR, No. 246, (July 1994), p.9-10. 
20 ‘Intersind joins forces with Confindustria’ EIRR, No. 246, (July 1994), p.9-10. 
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As will be described in the next section Confindustria sought to protect the collective 
interests of both small and large firms in the telecommunications sector ensuring ‘fair 
competition’ and it negotiated the first sectoral agreement. Subsequently, it created 
the first employer association Assotelecommunicazioni or ASSTEL on 29 November 
2002 with legal competence to represent its firm-members in the labour relations 
realm. The association was not dominated by the ex monopoly Telecom Italia, and the 
president was usually coming from one of the new entrants (e.g. Vodafone) balancing 
views of smaller operators and the incumbent in frequent meetings.21 Eventually, 
Federcomin was merged with FITA (Federazione Italiana del Terziario Avanzato per 
I Servizi Innovativi e Professionalli) on 7 November 2006 and formed an association 
of ‘network services’ as Confindustria Servizi Innovativi e Tecnologici.22 The 
telecoms employer association, ASSTEL, became one of the affiliates of this 
federation. 
 
 
Table 3. Main Business Associations in the Italian Telecoms Sector. 
Organisation Function Membership/Affiliation 
Associazione delle 
Imprese Esercenti 
Servizi di 
Telecomunicazioni 
ASSTEL 
 
Represents the interests of all 
telecommunications  companies; 
Employers Association since 
2002; Signatory to national 
wage agreement;  
Members: 28 companies 
(2006); affiliated member of  
Confindustria Servizi 
Innovativi e Tecnologici 
Confindustria Servizi 
Innovativi e 
Tecnologici 
Est. 2006  
Represents the interests of main 
telecommunications, radio-
television, and Information / 
Communication Technology 
companies 
Outcome of a merger between 
FITA and Federcomin; affiliate 
member of Confindustria 
Intersind 
Est. 1958 
 
Represented all state-owned 
(IRI) public enterprises with 
sectoral divisions 
Dissolved in 1994-6 and 
absorbed by Confindustria and 
evolved into Federcomin 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
3. Italian Telecoms in the early 2000s: The Centralisation of Collective 
Bargaining 
 
The institutional change from firm-level bargaining to industry-wide bargaining in 
Italian telecoms was neither easy nor straightforward. In the context of increased 
penetration of flexible working practices at the company level, the sector was 
characterised by extreme diversity in working conditions across firms. As mentioned 
above, the entry of Omnitel in the mobile telephone sector back in 1995 was very 
disturbing for unions’ plans to have a single national contract. Not only did Omnitel 
apply the metalworking sector wage agreement, but it also poached highly qualified 
                                                 
21 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 3 (22/11/2010). 
22 ‘Nasce Confidustria Servizi Innovativi: Fusione tra Federcomin e Fita sotto la presidenza di Alberto 
Tripi’ Confindustria Press Relase, (7/11/2006), available at:  
http://www.assinform.it/aree_sx/informazioni/comunicati/comunicato_071106_fusione.htm [accessed: 
25/09/2011]. 
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professionals from Telecom Italia and paying them higher salaries.23 This situation led 
the unions to call national strikes several times during the mid 1990s in order to voice 
their demand for a single wage agreement across the sector.24 
 
By the end of the 1990s the situation was as follows. Telecom Italia had a rather 
generous company agreement, which covered employees across the business group 
such as TIM (mobile telephony) and Tin.it (internet service provider). On the other 
hand, Omnitel (mobile telephony) and Infostrada (fixed telephony) applied the less 
generous metalworking sector agreement, but they could afford to pay a premium for 
poached personnel. Wind (fixed telephony) applied a special agreement negotiated 
with the union confederations similar to the electricity sector agreement of ENEL (of 
which it was a subsidiary). Finally, other smaller companies were not bound by any 
agreement. As a corollary, the three peak confederations’ (CGIL, CISL, and UIL) 
shared the fear that the combination of multiple bargaining arrangements and high 
competitive pressures would lead to a ‘race-to-bottom’ for working conditions.25 
 
Initially, the strategy of the unions was to put pressure for the extension of the 
Telecom Italia agreement across the sector. However, its terms and conditions were 
considered as very onerous by the new companies, and refused to apply it to their 
workers.26 In that period the firms did not want a single contract, and there were 
divisions between them: Telecom Italia wanted a contract because it was a necessary 
tool for safeguarding peace during the restructuring process; the larger players such as 
Vodafone, Wind and Omnitel wanted a contract, but not as generous as that of 
Telecom Italia; and finally, the smaller telecom operators did not want any contract at 
all. 27 
 
Faced with those divisions between firms, the unions’ strategy was to put pressure to 
Telecom Italia and Confindustria to negotiate an agreement for the sector since there 
was no employer association with a legal competence to represent firms in this sector. 
To this end, they pursued meetings with the CEO of Telecom Italia, to pull the strings 
in Confindustria and other firms. Indeed, after meeting with the trade unions in July 
1999 the new CEO of Telecom Italia, Roberto Colaninno, agreed to provide the sector 
with a single contract. Colaninno characterised this choice as ‘essential and decisive’ 
adding that: 
‘I am ready to personally sit at the bargaining table. I fully agree with the unions; it 
remains to overcome plenty of resistance from various interested companies‘28. 
 
In other words, the Italian confederal unions shared a strategic objective to push for 
the centralisation and put the broader interests of employees from the whole sector 
above the narrow interests of employees in the incumbent operator. Notably, they 
                                                 
23 Single Telecom agreement problems EIRR, No. 255, (April 1995), p.9. 
24 Single Telecom agreement problems EIRR, No. 255, (April 1995), p.9. 
25 Author’s interviews with sectoral labour representative 3 (25/05/2010); and with sectoral labour 
representative 4 (25/05/2010); ‘Dispute and talks over sectoral agreement for telecommunications’, 
EIROnline, (March 2000), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/03/inbrief/it0003147n.htm [accessed: 25/09/2011]. 
26 ‘Sectoral agreement signed in telecommunications’ EIROnline, (July 2000), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/07/feature/it0007158f.htm [accessed: 25/09/2011]. 
27 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 6 (25/11/2010) and with sectoral business 
representative 3 (22/11/2010). 
28 ‘Colaninno: sì si contratto unico delle Tic’ La Stampa, No.203, (27/07/1999), p.16. 
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refused to negotiate a new contract for Telecom Italia employees, unless collective 
bargaining is first centralised covering all employees in the sector.29 Their strategy 
was to pursue the argument of ensuring ‘fair competition’ (concorrenza leale) in the 
sector for which Confindustria was committed in an Accord of 1998 with the 
government and the peak confederal unions. As a labour informant noted: 
 
‘The June 2000 national contract was an effect of an earlier Accord between government 
and the peak business and labour associations. It was the era of privatisation of public 
services; the idea was thrown in an Accord in 199830 towards fair competition in 
telecommunications, water, gas and electricity, transportation. The telecoms market was 
liberalised and the competition was intense because of the new entrants. The new firms 
increasingly took market shares ‘crashing’ Telecom Italia. Therefore, the aim of the 
accord between Confindustria, government, and us was to ensure fair competition and 
focus competition on services quality and prices, rather than on wages.’31 
 
Responding to this situation, Confindustria recognised that the simultaneous 
application of different wage agreements in the sector was creating conditions of 
unfair competition among firms.32 Therefore, it joined the bargaining table in order to 
create a level-playing field for its members by agreeing with the unions on the first 
national contract.33 The final agreement, which was signed on 28 June 2000, provided 
for minimum conditions across the sector at the lowest common denominator with a 
component of ‘negotiated flexibility’.34 As showed in the previous sections, unions 
were pragmatic in accepting flexibility in employment practices, since their priority 
was to increase employment levels and bargaining coverage for the whole sector. The 
agreed minimum wages accommodated the new and smaller companies in the sector, 
which could benefit from social peace.35  
 
Additionally, the introduction of performance related pay was delegated to the firm 
level bargaining to suit individual needs of firms. In exchange, the agreement 
confirmed the two-level bargaining system, whereas its coverage was wide including 
not only companies providing telephony services, but also internet service providers 
and small specialised firms. The other side of the compromise involved an increase in 
numerical and working time flexibility, in exchange for training and reduction of total 
working time. In terms of working time flexibility, the agreement specified the 
establishment of ‘individual time bank accounts’ and employees would be able to 
accumulate overtime and subsequently take those hours as leave.36 Weekly working 
time was set at 38.5 hours on average over a six-month reference period. The increase 
in flexibility was dubbed as ‘just-in-time working’ (flessibilita tempestiva). 
Management could request from labour representatives - at a very short notice (48 
hours) – to alter working time schedules (up to 48 hours per week and 12 hour per 
                                                 
29 ‘Sindacati: a rischio il rinnovo del contratto per Telecom’ La Reppublica, (27/08/1999), p.38. 
30 This is the ‘National social pact for development and employment’ signed in 1998. 
31 Author’s interviews with sectoral labour representative 3 (25/05/2010) and with sectoral labour 
representative 4 (25/05/2010). 
32 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 3 (22/11/2010). 
33 Author’s interviews with sectoral business representative 3 (22/11/2010); with sectoral labour 
representative 3 (25/05/2010); and with sectoral labour representative 4 (25/05/2010). 
34 ‘Contratto unico per la new economy’ La Stampa, No. 174, (29/09/2000), p.19; ‘Un contratto unico 
per la new economy’ La Reppublica, (29/06/2000), p. 35. 
35 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 3 (22/11/2010); ‘Sectoral agreement signed 
in telecommunications’ EIROnline, (July 2000), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/07/feature/it0007158f.htm [accessed: 25/09/2011]. 
36 ‘First telecommunications accord’ EIRR, No. 319, (August 2000), p.8. 
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day) so as to meet increased customer demand in busy periods.37 In terms of 
numerical flexibility (fixed term contracts and temporary agency work) this was 
permitted at levels exceeding those provided in previous firm level agreements.  
 
However, the increase came with strings attached. Fixed-term contracts and agency 
workers could constitute no more than 30 per cent of the overall workforce (15+15), 
in the South of Italy (Mezzogiorno) and no more than 26 per cent of the workforce 
(13+13) in companies located in the Central and Northern parts of Italy. A further 
increase might be permissible, but it was delegated to the firm level bargaining to suit 
individual companies needs. The atypical contracts were allowed to deal with skills 
shortages and labour shortages during periods of holidays, training leaves, busy 
periods of production or peaks of activity due to new orders or to the launch of a new 
product. In other words, working time flexibility was instrumentally used to meet 
fluctuations in customer demand. Finally, the agreement provided for the operation of 
job-sharing and teleworking and included the establishment of two joint national 
committees entrusted with the introduction of functional flexibility. The first 
committee would analyse training needs in the sector, develop training programmes, 
and generally manage vocational training, while the second would examine the job 
classification system update occupational profiles in response to rapidly changing 
technologies. 
 
The national industry agreement in 2000 created a momentum and triggered changes 
in labour and business representations. Peak associations took initiatives to solidify 
the institution of sectoral collective bargaining. The unions were already in the 
process of taking over representation from their metalworking colleagues, becoming 
the sole representatives in the sector. After SLC and FISTEL, UILCOM was the third 
union to be transformed into a sectoral ‘network services’ union representing all firms 
in telecoms, information technology and broadcasting. On the business side, 
Confindustria took the initiative to organise telecoms companies around a new 
association ASSTEL. The smaller firms in the sector -which resisted initially the 
centralisation of collective bargaining- were faced with a united front from the three 
labour confederations. Thus, the worse-case scenario for the resisting firms was the 
prospect of continuous industrial unrest, whereby their employees would ask for 
comparable wages with those in Telecom Italia’38 At the same time, the multiplicity 
of bargaining arrangements was creating conditions of unfair competition, since some 
firms were not bound by any agreement, thus obtaining a cost advantage.  
 
Confindustria was able to offer to individual firms a very lucrative compromise 
getting for them the ‘best of both worlds’: ensure peace and minimum common 
standards at the sector level and increasing employment flexibility at the company 
level. Notably, ASSTEL was an association that was not dominated by Telecom 
Italia, but took the interests of smaller operators and other firms into account. Hence, 
employer associability was established in the sector and the negotiation of wage 
agreement was taken over by their sectoral associations (ASSTEL for employers, and 
SLC, FISTEL, and UILCOM for trade unions), which signed a new sectoral 
agreement in 2002. 
 
                                                 
37 ‘First telecommunications accord’ EIRR, No. 319, (August 2000), p.8-9. 
38 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 3 (22/11/2010). 
 17 
The unions kept up their strategy of avoiding a ‘race to bottom’ in working 
conditions, however, accepting the introduction of ‘negotiated flexibility’. By 2005 
the remaining conflict concerned the working conditions of call-centre employees and 
the unions wanted to include measures to increase their job security.39 The unions’ 
primary demand was the extension of the collective agreement coverage to include 
call-centre companies and regulate subcontracting and outsourcing in a growing and 
very competitive sector. Indeed, on 3 December 2005 trade unions and ASSTEL 
signed a new sectoral agreement, thus, solidifying the centralisation of collective 
bargaining. Generally its provisions included an increase in negotiated flexibility in 
exchange for extension of coverage: (i) the agreement’s coverage was extended to 
include all relevant firms to which major telecoms players were outsourcing: call-
centre firms, web-services and digital/multimedia services companies; (ii) job 
classification system would be updated to define new job profiles in information 
technology and networks; (iii) fixed term and agency contracts would be permitted 
according to previously agreed levels; (iv) work-entry contracts and professional 
apprenticeships would be allowed within limits; (v) the reference period for working 
time could be extended to one year after negotiation at the company level, while 
overtime was made more flexible by removing quarterly restrictions and replacing 
them with an annual limit; (vi) compliance with laws on social security and health and 
safety was a prerequisite to combat undeclared and irregular work in subcontracting 
firms; (vii) RSUs in telecoms firms were granted increased information and 
consultation rights, especially with regard to equal opportunities and workplace health 
and safety.40 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The Italian telecommunications sector is certainly a ‘tough case’ (George & Bennett, 
2005:121) for earlier theoretical conjectures. Centralisation of bargaining at the 
industry level was least expected under the scope conditions of intensified 
competition and pervasive introduction of labour flexibility. The competitive 
pressures appeared high and the new firms made an extensive use of flexible 
employment practices (numerical flexibility and outsourcing, working time, and pay 
flexibility). In spite of these pressures –which were expected to keep bargaining 
decentralised– the trade unions managed to successfully centralise wage bargaining in 
the sector. How do we explain this particular path of institutional change?  
 
The paper attempted to introduce ‘more agency’ to track and explain institutional 
change and unveil ‘how actors can circumvent or recast those institutions toward new 
ends’ (Jackson & Deeg, 2008:554). Unlike the earlier literature that accepted the 
primary importance of structural factors (i.e. changes in the external business 
environment and/or the internal organisation of firms (Brown & Walsh, 1991; Katz, 
1993; Marginson et al., 2003; Mueller & Purcell, 1992)), the analysis pinpointed the 
importance of collective agents in shaping the direction of institutional change. The 
                                                 
39 ‘New collective agreement reached for telecommunications sector’ EIROnline, (January 2006), 
available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/12/feature/it0512305f.htm [accessed: 
25/09/2011]. 
40 ‘New collective agreement reached for telecommunications sector’ EIROnline, (January 2006), 
available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/12/feature/it0512305f.htm [accessed: 
25/09/2011]. 
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labour side appeared able to speak with a ‘single voice’ and pursue the shared 
strategic objective of centralisation. At the same time, the employer associations 
managed to strike a compromise for their members offering the ‘best of both worlds’: 
fair competition via labour cost standardisation at the sector-level and increased 
flexibility at the company level. 
 
More specifically, the three union confederations transformed the firm level unions of 
Telecom Italia into sectoral federations, so as to accept members from the new 
telecoms operators. Even before the opening up of the market in 1998, they shared a 
strategic goal to centralise bargaining in the sector and devoted their resources to this 
aim, by organising strikes and inviting the government to intervene and aid their 
effort. In the absence of representative business associations in the sector, the peak 
trade union organisations and peak employer association (Confindustria) signed the 
first agreement for the sector in 2000. Confindustria literally filled the gap of the 
missing sectoral employer association and the trade unions were able to speak with a 
single voice, despite organisational divisions. The employers’ motivation for 
accepting the centralised agreement lay in ensuring ‘fair competition’ in the sector by 
setting a level-playing field in wages and working conditions.  
 
Subsequently, both sides resolved their representation problems and included 
members from new firms. Confindustria absorbed the public employer association 
Intersind, which had the legal competence to negotiate labour relations for Telecom 
Italia. Afterwards, it created a new association, ASSTEL, in which both large and 
small telecoms operators became members. Similarly, the unions appeased militant 
tensions in the new firms via unitary workplace representation (RSU), and organised 
employees across the sector. Thus, the first telecoms agreement between the new 
sectoral associations was signed in 2002 followed by another in 2005. 
 
The empirical analysis of this paper could inform wider debates in comparative 
employment systems which look either at converging or diverging trends in the 
institutional context of the labour market; or at specific labour market practices inside 
firms (Mills et al., 2008). Admittedly, a sizeable body of literature has shown that 
convergence is not happening and diversity persists not only across the institutional 
spheres of industrial relations in Europe (Hyman, 2001), but also in the range of 
human resources practices utilised by European firms (Lorenz & Valeyre, 2005). 
Notably, Katz and Darbishire (2000) suggested that there is a trend towards 
‘converging divergences’ entailing an increasing variation in employment practices 
within countries, and greater homogeneity across sectors. This paper furthers the 
debate by suggesting that the evolution of labour market institutions and the 
introduction of flexible employment practices are shaped by the coalitions between 
collective actors. Convergence to a single institutional configuration due to market 
liberalisation or internationalisation of working practices is not inevitable; instead, 
domestic actors may still shape the direction of institutional change. 
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